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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 12-1825 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES DENNIS, 
                              Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Criminal No. 2-10-cr-00233-001 
(Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 10, 2013) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 James Dennis appeals the District Court’s orders denying his motions to 
suppress physical evidence obtained from a search of his car and to withdraw his guilty 
plea for possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute. We will 
2 
 
affirm. 
I. 
 In August 2009, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) intercepted phone 
calls between Dennis and A.G., a known drug dealer they were investigating, in which 
the two men negotiated a drug buy.
1
  Dennis and A.G. agreed to meet at a predetermined 
time and location in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  DEA agents surveilled this location at 
the designated time and observed Dennis arrive in a gold Chevrolet Tahoe.  A.G. and 
another man entered Dennis’s waiting car.  Approximately fifteen minutes later, the two 
men exited and Dennis drove away.   
The DEA agents informed Pennsylvania state police of the suspected drug sale and 
requested that state troopers intercept Dennis.  Specifically, the DEA agents told the state 
police that the driver of the gold Chevrolet Tahoe had just met with the target of a 
wiretap drug trafficking investigation and had purchased 500 grams of cocaine that could 
be found in the vehicle.  The DEA agents asked the police to develop an independent 
basis for stopping Dennis in order to conceal their ongoing investigation of A.G. 
Based on the DEA’s tip, Pennsylvania state troopers located Dennis’s car and 
pulled him over for suspected violations of the Pennsylvania motor vehicle code.
2
  A 
field sobriety test indicated that Dennis was not intoxicated; a pat-down revealed no 
contraband; and a background check revealed several prior drug convictions, but no open 
                                                 
1
 The calls were intercepted through a court-authorized wiretap of A.G.’s phone. 
2
 Prior to pulling Dennis over, the troopers noted that his car had heavily tinted 
windows—a possible violation of the Pennsylvania motor vehicle code.  The troopers 
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warrants.  The troopers noted that Dennis’s car smelled strongly of air freshener, which 
can be used to mask the scent of narcotics.  Dennis declined the troopers’ request to 
search his vehicle and a canine unit was called to the scene, which arrived approximately 
an hour later.  After the dog failed to alert, the troopers told Dennis he was free to leave, 
but that his car would be seized because they suspected it contained contraband.  
Subsequently, the troopers obtained a warrant to search Dennis’s car.  A search 
uncovered a manila envelope containing approximately 500 grams of cocaine.  
Dennis was indicted for possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to 
distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).  The District Court denied Dennis’s motion to 
suppress the physical evidence obtained from the search of his car, finding that the state 
police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search based on the information 
provided by the DEA agents.  On March 1, 2011, one day after his motion to suppress 
was denied, Dennis entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to possession of 
500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1).  
On November 1, 2011, Dennis moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that 
his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that his prior counsel misled him 
into pleading guilty.
3
  The District Court denied Dennis’s motion to withdraw his guilty 
                                                                                                                                                             
also observed the car weaving within its lane—a possible indication of an intoxicated 
driver. 
3
 Several weeks after entering his guilty plea, Dennis wrote to the District Court asking to 
withdraw his guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel.  The attorney who 
represented Dennis at his guilty plea hearing then moved to withdraw as counsel.  The 
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plea and sentenced him to 180 months of imprisonment, 8 years of supervised release, a 
fine of $2500, and a special assessment of $100.  Dennis timely appeals the District 
Court’s denial of his motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his car 
and to withdraw his guilty plea.  Dennis’s plea agreement preserved his right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the denial of a motion to suppress “for clear error as 
to the underlying factual findings and exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s 
application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citing United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998)).  We review the 
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).   
III. 
We agree with the District Court that the DEA’s tip was sufficient to provide the 
state police with probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Dennis’s car after they 
had impounded it.
4
   
“The automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits law enforcement to 
                                                                                                                                                             
District Court granted the motion and appointed new counsel, who represented Dennis on 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
4
 Because the warrantless search was supported by probable cause, we will not address 
the propriety of the search warrant.  See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 78 F.3d 399, 
400-01 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding an automobile search supported by probable cause, 
notwithstanding any potential deficiencies in warrant obtained by officers).  
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seize and search an automobile without a warrant if ‘probable cause exists to believe it 
contains contraband.’”  United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)).  The police’s authority to conduct 
such a search adheres even if the automobile has been seized and immobilized at the 
stationhouse, provided the police had probable cause to search when they initially 
stopped the vehicle.  See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (upholding 
the warrantless search of a car secured at a police stationhouse where police had probable 
cause to search the car when they initially stopped it); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565, 570 (1991) (“Following Chambers, if the police have probable cause to justify 
a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct either an 
immediate or a delayed search of the vehicle.”). 
Probable cause to search requires a “‘fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”  Burton, 288 F.3d at 103 (quoting Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  The officer conducting a search need not personally 
possess knowledge of the facts giving rise to the probable cause to conduct the search.  
See id. at 99 (“[T]he arresting officer need not possess . . . the facts supporting probable 
cause, but can instead rely on an instruction to arrest delivered by other officers 
possessing probable cause.”). 
  Given the facts arising out of the DEA’s investigation, probable cause existed to 
believe that Dennis’s car contained contraband.  Recorded phone calls revealed Dennis’s 
plan to purchase drugs from A.G., a known drug dealer, at a specific time and location.  
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DEA agents then observed A.G. enter Dennis’s car at the specified time and location.  
These facts permitted the DEA agents to conclude that A.G. and Dennis had 
consummated their planned transaction and that drugs were present in Dennis’s car—
facts which the DEA communicated to the Pennsylvania state police.  Thus, the state 
troopers had probable cause to search Dennis’s car.  
The trooper’s probable cause to search Dennis’s car was not vitiated by the drug-
sniffing dog’s failure to alert.  See United States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232, 236 (1st Cir. 
1982) (“The dog’s failure to react does not . . . destroy the ‘probable cause’ that would 
otherwise exist.”), abrogated on other grounds by Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 
(2010).  Nor was the Fourth Amendment offended by the troopers’ pretext for stopping 
Dennis’s car, see United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[P]retextual 
traffic stops supported by reasonable suspicion do not run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment.”), or the sixty minutes it took for the canine unit to arrive, see Burton, 288 
F.3d at 101-02 (explaining that the temporary seizure of a vehicle for approximately 
forty-five minutes pending the arrival of a canine unit did not offend the Fourth 
Amendment). 
IV. 
Dennis also lacks adequate grounds to withdraw his guilty plea.  In order for a 
guilty plea to be valid, it must represent “‘a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’”  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 
(1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).  A criminal defendant 
may withdraw a guilty plea after the court accepts it, but before the court imposes a 
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sentence, if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).   
In determining whether the defendant has met this burden, a district court must 
consider three factors:  “(1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength 
of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government 
would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.”  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).  With respect to the first factor, “[b]ald assertions of 
innocence are insufficient . . . . ‘Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by facts in 
the record that support a claimed defense.’”  Id. at 252 (quoting United States v. Brown, 
250 F.3d 811, 818 (3d Cir. 2001)).  When asserting his innocence, a defendant must also 
provide a sufficient explanation for the contradictory position he took at his guilty plea 
hearing.  Id. at 253 (citing United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 
408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
With respect to the first factor, the District Court concluded that Dennis failed to 
adequately assert his innocence because he could not buttress his bald assertion of 
innocence with facts from the record.  At the plea withdrawal hearing, Dennis asserted 
his innocence by stating, “I’m not guilty of being in possession with the intent to 
distribute 500 grams of cocaine.”  Dennis attempted to support this assertion with two 
facts:  (1) he was not in his car when the drugs were discovered and (2) he did not see the 
police remove the drugs from his car.  Yet these meager details do not buttress his 
assertion of innocence—they merely describe the circumstances surrounding the search 
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of his car.  It is unremarkable that Dennis was not present when the drugs were 
discovered given that the search occurred after the police had impounded his car.
5
  
Moreover, Dennis has failed to explain the inconsistency between his present assertion of 
innocence and his earlier admissions of guilt.
6
   
With respect to the second factor, the District Court concluded that Dennis’s 
reasons for seeking to withdraw his guilty plea—that he was tricked, misled, and rushed 
into pleading guilty—were thoroughly contradicted by the record.  At the Rule 11 
colloquy, the District Court stressed that the decision to plead guilty should not be made 
hastily and repeatedly offered to postpone the hearing so that Dennis could further 
contemplate his decision.  Yet Dennis insisted, “I’m ready. I’m ready.”  Dennis also 
confirmed that he had sufficient time to confer with his lawyer and was satisfied with the 
advice he had received.  The District Court then carefully walked Dennis through the 
charges against him; the government’s obligation to prove its case at trial if he decided to 
plead not guilty; the specific terms of the plea agreement, including the rights he would 
waive by agreeing to it; and the mandatory minimum sentence he faced.   
The record clearly establishes that Dennis’s decision to plead guilty was made 
voluntarily, knowingly, and with a full understanding of the consequences.  There is 
ample support for the District Court’s conclusions that (1) Dennis failed to adequately 
                                                 
5
 If Dennis cited these facts to suggest that the police planted the cocaine in his car, his 
assertion of innocence remains unsupported.  Assertions of innocence in a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea require support from facts in the record, not speculation. 
6
 At the Rule 11 colloquy, Dennis agreed that the government’s version of events “is 
what happened,” and responded “yes” when asked by the District Court if he had 
intended to sell the cocaine found in his car. 
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assert his innocence and (2) his reasons for seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea lacked 
merit.  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Dennis’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.7 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the rulings of the District Court denying 
Dennis’s motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his car and to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  
                                                 
7
 Because we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the 
first two factors, there is no need to consider the third factor—whether the government 
would be prejudiced by withdrawal.  Jones, 336 F.3d at 255. 
